Recommending with an Agenda: Active Learning of Private Attributes using
  Matrix Factorization by Bhagat, Smriti et al.
Recommending with an Agenda: Active Learning of
Private Attributes using Matrix Factorization
Smriti Bhagat, Udi Weinsberg, Stratis Ioannidis, Nina Taft
Technicolor, Los Altos, CA
{smriti.bhagat, udi.weinsberg, stratis.ioannidis, nina.taft}@technicolor.com
ABSTRACT
Recommender systems leverage user demographic informa-
tion, such as age, gender, etc., to personalize recommenda-
tions and better place their targeted ads. Oftentimes, users
do not volunteer this information due to privacy concerns, or
due to a lack of initiative in filling out their online profiles.
We illustrate a new threat in which a recommender learns
private attributes of users who do not voluntarily disclose
them. We design both passive and active attacks that so-
licit ratings for strategically selected items, and could thus
be used by a recommender system to pursue this hidden
agenda. Our methods are based on a novel usage of Bayesian
matrix factorization in an active learning setting. Evalua-
tions on multiple datasets illustrate that such attacks are
indeed feasible and use significantly fewer rated items than
static inference methods. Importantly, they succeed without
sacrificing the quality of recommendations to users.
1. INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems rely on knowing their users – not
just their preferences (i.e., ratings on items), but also their
social and demographic information, e.g., age, gender, po-
litical affiliation, and ethnicity [13, 18]. A rich user profile
allows a recommender system to better personalize its ser-
vices, and at the same time enables additional monetization
opportunities, such as targeted advertising.
Users of a recommender system know they are disclos-
ing their preferences (or ratings) for movies, books, or other
items (we use movies as our running example). A recom-
mender may obtain additional social and demographic in-
formation about its users by explicitly soliciting it [13, 18].
While some users may willingly disclose such information,
others may be more privacy-sensitive and elect to only re-
veal their ratings. Privacy research has shown that some
users are uncomfortable revealing their demographic data
to personalization systems [1, 14]. Even when such services
provide transparency about their data collection and use
practices [1], some users are unwilling to disclose personal
data despite the allure of personalized services. In [13] the
authors conduct a small scale user study on Amazon Turk
that examines how to motivate users to disclose their demo-
graphic data.
For users who wish to withhold some demographic infor-
mation, a recommender can still undermine their attempt
at privacy. In previous work [29], we show that users’ movie
ratings can be used to predict their gender with 80% accu-
racy. Other studies also show the potential to infer demo-
graphics from a range of online user activities [2, 3, 17, 19].
In this work, we consider a recommender system that offers
a legitimate service, yet is simultaneously malicious: it pur-
posefully attempts to extract certain attributes from users
who choose to withhold them. Unlike previous work that
studies static attacks on the complete data, we consider an
active learning setting, in which the recommender system
aims to efficiently (quickly and accurately) infer a user’s
private attribute via interactive questioning. Recommender
systems routinely ask users to rate a few items, as a means
to address a “cold start” setting, or to improve the quality
of recommendations. We leverage these instances of inter-
actions with the user, alongside with the observation that
item selection is at the recommender’s discretion, to propose
a new attack. We hypothesize that if the sequence of ques-
tions (items to rate) is carefully selected, the recommender
system can quickly (so as not to be detected by the user)
determine a user’s private attribute with high confidence,
thereby violating her privacy. A key idea in the design of
this attack is to leverage matrix factorization (MF) as the
basis for inference. Most recommender systems use matrix
factorization (MF) models as a building block for provid-
ing recommendations [16]. While MF is well understood for
rating prediction, it has generally not been applied for in-
ference. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
to leverage MF as the basis for building both (a) an infer-
ence method of private attributes using item ratings and (b)
an active learning method that selects items in a way that
maximizes inference confidence in the smallest number of
questions.
Our contributions are as follows:
• First, we propose a novel classification method for deter-
mining a user’s binary private attribute – her type – based
upon ratings alone. In particular, we use matrix factor-
ization to learn item profiles and type-dependent biases,
and show how to incorporate this information into a clas-
sification algorithm. This classification is consistent with
Bayesian matrix factorization.
• Second, we demonstrate that the resulting classification
method is well suited for learning of a user’s type. A
simple passive approach, ordering items based on a set
of weights computed off-line, works quite well in many
cases. Beyond this, we design an active learning algo-
rithm for selecting the next item to ask a user to rate:
each selection maximizes the expected confidence of the
private attribute’s inference. Equivalently, the selections
of the active learning algorithm minimize the expected
risk of misclassifying the user’s private attribute.
• Third, we show that our active learning method is very
ar
X
iv
:1
31
1.
68
02
v2
  [
cs
.L
G]
  3
0 J
ul 
20
14
efficient, as item selection can reuse computations made
during previous selections. We show that this reduces
the na¨ıve solution that is cubic in the number of ratings,
to one that is quadratic in the number of ratings.
• Fourth, we extensively evaluate the above classifier and
selection methods on three real-world datasets: Movie-
lens, Flixster and Politics-and-TV. We show that our
methods consistently outperform other baselines; with
only 10 questions, we achieve between 3-20% higher clas-
sification accuracy on different datasets. Importantly,
such an attack can be carried out without any sacrifice
to the recommendations made to the user.
In the remainder of the paper, we review related work
(Section 2) and formulate our problem (Section 3). We then
present our classifier (Section 4), our active learning method
(Section 5), and our empirical results (Section 6).
2. RELATED WORK
A number of studies have shown that user demographics
can be inferred from various types of online user activity. For
example, Bhagat et al. [2] show that it is possible to learn
age and gender information from blogs. Mislove et al. [19]
study data from online social networks and illustrate that
even when only a fraction of users provide profile attributes
(such as location, interests, etc.), it is possible to infer these
attributes among users who do not disclose them. Bi et
al. [3] show how demographics can be inferred from search
queries, and Kosinski et al. [17] show that several personality
traits, including political views, sexual orientation, and drug
use can be accurately predicted from Facebook “likes”.
Recommender systems were shown to be exploitable by
several works utilizing off-line attacks [4, 21, 29]. Closest to
our setting, Weinsberg et al. [29] empirically studied how
to infer a user’s gender from her movie ratings using a va-
riety of different classifiers, showing that logistic regression
and SVMs succeed with an accuracy close to 80%. We de-
part from [29] in multiple ways. First, we introduce a novel
factor-based classifier, that relies on the Bayesian assump-
tions behind MF. Second, we study a recommender system
in an adversarial setting that actively adapts item selection
to quickly learn the private attributes. Finally, we establish
that our classifier is very well suited for this task.
The Bayesian model underlying MF (discussed in detail in
Section 3.2) was recently employed by Silva and Carin [27]
to actively learn the actual factors (i.e., the user and item
profiles) in MF. More specifically, the authors consider a
recommender system that adaptively selects which items to
ask its users to rate in order to diminish the entropy of its
user and item profiles as quickly as possible. The entropy
estimation is based on the Gaussian noise and prior assump-
tions underlying MF, which we also employ in our work.
A variety of active learing objective were also studied by
Sutherland et al. [28], including minimizing the prediction
error on unrated items, reducing the profile uncertainty, and
identifying highly rated items. We depart from the above
works as the goal of our learning task is to discover a user’s
demographic information, captured by a categorical type,
rather the above objectives motivated by rating prediction.
Biases have been used extensively to improve prediction per-
formance in MF [15, 16]. Our introduction of demographic-
specific biases is not for improving prediction per se–though
this does happen; rather, incorporating such biases allows
Figure 1: System description. The recommender system
uses a dataset of user ratings to train a type classifier. An
item selection process proposes items to the user, which she
subsequently rates; these ratings are used to infer her type.
us to use the classic MF model as a basis for classification
and, subsequently, active learning.
In the classic active learning setting [7,8], a learner wishes
to disambiguate among a set of several possible hypotheses,
each represented as a function over a set of inputs. Only
one of the hypotheses is valid; to discover it, the learner has
access to an oracle that returns the evaluation of the valid
hypothesis on a given input. In the case of a noiseless oracle,
that always returns the correct evaluation on a query, Gen-
eralized Binary Search (GBS) discovers the valid hypothesis
in a number of queries within a polylogarithmic factor from
the optimal [7, 8]. Our setup can be cast into the above
framework in the context of a noisy oracle, whose evalua-
tions may not necessarily be exact. GBS is known to yield
arbitrarily suboptimal results in the presence of noise [9].
Though algorithms for restricted noise models exist (see,
e.g., [22] and [9]), no algorithm with provable performance
guarantees is known in the presence of an oracle with ar-
bitrary noise. Unfortunately, none of the existing models
apply to the noisy setting we encounter here.
3. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Problem Statement
We consider a recommender system, depicted in Figure 1,
that provides a legitimate item recommendation service, but
at the same time maliciously seeks to infer a private user
attribute. The system has access to a dataset, provided
by non-privacy-sensitive users, that contains item ratings as
well as a categorical variable, which we refer to as the user
type. The type is a private attribute such as gender, age,
political affiliation, etc. A new user, who is privacy sensitive
(i.e., her type is unknown) interacts with the system. The
recommender system actively presents items for the user to
rate, masquerading it as a way to improve recommendations
in the cold-start setting. In this context, our goal is twofold:
1. We wish to design a type classifier that discovers the type
of the user based on her ratings. We seek to leverage the
latent factor model prevalent in matrix-factorization, a
technique successfully used for rating prediction by rec-
ommender systems.
2. We wish to address the problem of actively learning a
user’s type. We aim to design an item selection method,
that determines the order in which items are shown to a
user for her to rate. The best order finds the user’s type
as quickly as possible.
For the attack to be considered successful, the recommender
system needs to obtain high confidence in the value of the
inferred type, with a minimum number of questions posed
to the user. As our classifier and item selection methods
rely heavily on matrix factorization, we review this as well
as the latent factor model that underlies it below.
3.2 Data Model & Matrix Factorization
We use the following notation to describe the training
dataset of the recommender. The dataset comprises of rat-
ings to m items in set M ≡ {1, . . . ,m} given by n users
in set N ≡ {1, . . . , n}. We denote by rij the rating of user
i ∈ N to item j ∈M, and by E ⊂ N×M the set of user-item
pairs (i, j), for which a rating rij is present in the dataset.
Each user is characterized by a categorical type, which cap-
tures demographic information such as gender, occupation,
income category, etc. Focusing on binary types, we denote
by ti ∈ T ≡ {+1,−1} the type of user i ∈M.
We assume that the ratings are generated from the stan-
dard generative model used in matrix factorization, aug-
mented with type-dependent biases. More specifically, there
exist latent factors ui ∈ Rd, i ∈ N , and vj ∈ Rd, j ∈ M
(the user and item profiles, resp.) such that ratings are:
rij = u
T
i vj + zjti + ij , (i, j) ∈ E (1)
where ij ∼ N(0, σ20) are independent Gaussian noise vari-
ables and zjt is a type bias, capturing the effect of a type
on the item rating. Our model is thus parametrized by
U = [uTi ]i∈N ∈ Rn×d,V = [vTj ]j∈M ∈ Rm×d, and Z =
[zj,t]j∈M,t∈T ∈ Rm×|T |. We further assume a prior on user
and item profiles: for all i ∈ N , j ∈M,
ui ∼ N(0, σ2uI), and vj ∼ N(0, σ2vI), (2)
i.e., profiles are sampled from independent zero-mean mul-
tivariate Gaussian priors.
The Gaussian priors (2) are used in many works on so-
called Bayesian matrix factorization (see, e.g., [20, 24, 27]).
Under (1) and (2), the maximum likelihood estimation of
the model parameters reduces to the standard [15,16] mini-
mization of the (non-convex) regularized error:1
min
U,V,Z
∑
(i,j)∈E
(rij−uTi vj−zjti)2+λ
∑
i∈N
‖ui‖22+µ
∑
i∈M
‖vj‖22 (3)
with λ =
σ20
σ2u
and µ =
σ20
σ2v
. Given a dataset of ratings rij ,
(i, j) ∈ E and types ti, i ∈ N , the parameters U, V, Z can be
computed as local minima to (3) through standard methods
[16], such as gradient descent or alternating minimization,
while λ and µ are computed through cross-validation.
4. A FACTOR-BASED CLASSIFIER
We now turn our attention to the following classification
problem. Suppose that the recommender system, with ac-
cess to the dataset of ratings and types, has computed a
set of item profiles V as well as a set of biases Z, e.g., by
minimizing (3) through gradient descent. A new user ar-
rives in the system and submits ratings for items in some
set A ⊆ M, but does not submit her type. In order to by-
pass the user’s attempt at privacy, we need to construct a
classifier to infer the type of this new user.
1Note that, as is common practice, to ensure that the profiles
U, V obtained by (3) are invariant to a translation (shift) of
the ratings, we do not regularize the category biases (or,
equivalently, we assume no prior on Z).
In this section, we present a classifier that uses the item
profiles and biases (i.e., the latent factors obtained through
matrix factorization) to accomplish this task. We refer to
this classifier as a Factor-Based Classifier (FBC). Crucially,
FBC is consistent with the Bayesian model of matrix fac-
torization presented in the previous section. In particular,
it amounts to the maximum a-posteriori estimation of the
type under the bi-linear noise model (1) and the priors (2).
4.1 Type Posterior
For A ⊂ M the set of items for which the user submits
ratings, we introduce the following notation. We denote by
rA ≡ [rj ]j∈A ∈ R|A| the vector of ratings provided by the
user, by VA ≡ [vTj ]j∈A ∈ R|A|×d the matrix of profiles for
items rated, and by zAt ≡ [zjt]j∈A ∈ R|A| the vector of
type-t biases for items rated.
As in the previous section, we assume the new user has
an unknown profile u ∈ Rd and a type t ∈ {−1,+1}, such
that the ratings she submits follow (1), i.e.,
rj = u
T vj + zjt + j , j ∈ A, (4)
where j ∼ N(0, σ20). That is, conditioned on u and t, the
ratings rA = [rj ]j∈A ∈ R|A| given to items in A ⊂ [M ] are
distributed as follows:
Pr(rA | u, t) = e−‖rA−VAu−zAt‖
2
2/2σ
2
0/
(
σ0
√
2pi
)|A|
(5)
where σ20 is the noise variance.
Moreover, we assume as in the previous section that profile
u follows a zero-mean Gaussian prior with covariance σ2uI,
and that the type follows a uniform prior (i.e., each of the
two types is equally likely), i.e.:
Pr(u, t) = 0.5e−‖u‖
2
2/2σ
2
u/
(
σu
√
2pi
)d
(6)
4.2 Classification
Under the above assumptions, it is natural to classify the
incoming user using maximum a posteriori estimation of the
type t. In particular, FBC amounts to
tˆ(rA) = arg maxt∈T Pr(t | rA). (7)
Under this notation, FBC can be determined as follows:
Theorem 1. Under noise model (5) and prior (6), the
FBC classifier is given by
tˆ(rA) = sgn(δ
T
AMAr¯A) (8)
where r¯A ≡ rA − zA++zA−2 , δA ≡
zA+−zA−
2
, MA ≡ I −
VAΣ
−1
A V
T
A , and ΣA ≡ λI + V TA VA, for λ = σ
2
0
σ2u
.
Proof. Under model (5) and prior (6), conditioned on
type t, the ratings rA a user gives items in a set A ⊆ [M ]
are distributed according to:
Pr(rA | t) = e
(rA−zAt)T (VAΣ−1A V
T
A −I)(rA−zAt)
2σ20
(σ0
√
2pi)|A|(σu/σ0)d
√
det(ΣA)
(9)
where ΣA ≡ λI + V TA VA and λ ≡ σ
2
0
σ2u
. Hence, the posterior
probability of the user’s type is given by:
Pr(t | rA) = e
(rA−zAt)T (VAΣ−1A V TA−I)(rA−zAt)/2σ20∑
t′∈T
e(rA−zAt′ )
T (VAΣ−1A V
T
A−I)(rA−zAt′ )/2σ20
(10)
Type t = +1 is thus most likely if
(rA − zA+)T
(
VAΣ
−1
A V
T
A − I
)
(rA − zA+)−
(rA − zA−)T
(
VAΣ
−1
A V
T
A − I
)
(rA − zA−) ≥ 0
and it is easy to verify that (8) follows.
There are several important observations to be made regard-
ing FBC, as defined by Theorem 1.
Set of Classifiers. We first note that FBC in fact defines
a set of classifiers, each parametrized by set A ⊆ M: each
such classifier tˆ : R|A| → {−1,+1} takes as input any possi-
ble set of ratings rA ∈ R|A| as input. Note however that all
classifiers are trained jointly from the ratings dataset: this
“training” amounts to determining the item profiles V and
the item biases Z through matrix factorization. With V and
Z learned, when presented with ratings rA, the classifier can
compute the vectors r¯A, δA and the matrix MA needed to
determine the type. Indeed, the fact that training the clas-
sifier amounts to computing the latent factors/item profiles
is consistent with the observation that FBC shares the same
underlying Bayesian assumptions as matrix factorization.
Relationship to LDA. Second, for a given set of items
A, the classifier defined over ratings rA is a linear classifier.
In particular, (8) defines a hyperplane in R|A| above which
the user type is classified as +1 and below which the type
is classified as −1. In fact, when restricted to a specific set
of items A, (8) can be seen as classification through Linear
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) [11]. More formally, the proof
of Theorem 1 uses the fact that the ratings rA ∈ R|A| are
normally distributed with a mean that depends on the user
type and a covariance MA = (I − VAΣ−1A VA), as defined
in Theorem 1. As such, given a uniform prior on the types,
the most likely type can indeed be determined through LDA,
which yields a decision boundary precisely as in (8) (see, e.g.,
eq. (4.9) pp. 108 of [11]). Nevertheless, FBC significantly
departs from classical LDA in that all classifiers across all
sets A ⊆M are trained jointly.
Type Priors and Multi-Category Types. A similar
analysis to the one we discussed below allows us to extend
our results to non-uniform type priors, as well as to the
non-binary case. In the case of non-uniform type priors, the
decision boundary of the classifier has an additional term,
yielding:
δTAMAr¯A + log
pi+
pi−
≥ 0
where pit the prior probability of each type. Finally, multi-
category classification can be reduced to binary classifica-
tion, by comparing all possible pairs of types through (8),
and selecting the type that dominates all other types. Equiv-
alently, the decision boundaries of each type tesselate R|A|,
uniquely mapping each vector rA to the most likely type.
5. LEARNING STRATEGIES
The second task in designing this threat is to find a user’s
type quickly. In what follows, we present two strategies for
addressing this problem. The first is a passive strategy: the
recommender presents items to the user in a predetermined
order, computed off-line. The second is an active strategy:
the recommender selects which item to present to the user
next based on the answers she has given so far. Both strate-
gies are extensively evaluated in Section 6.
Algorithm 1 FBC-Selection
Input: Item profiles V , item biases Z, confidence τ
1: A← ∅
2: rA ← ∅
3: repeat
4: for all j ∈ M \ A do
5: Compute Lj through (11)
6: j∗ ← arg min
j∈M\A
Lj
7: Query user to obtain rj∗
8: A← A ∪ {j∗}, rA ← rA ∪ rj∗
9: until Pr(tˆ(rA) | rA) > τ
5.1 MaxGap: A Passive Strategy
A simple, passive method for presenting items to the user
is to (a) sort items j ∈M with respect to |δj |, the absolute
value of the gap between the type biases, and (b) present
items to the user in decreasing order. We call this strategy
MaxGap: intuitively, this method identifies the most dis-
criminative items in the dataset, and solicits responses to
these items first. Clearly, MaxGap does not take into ac-
count (or adapt to) how the user rates the items presented so
far. Despite this limitation, as we will see in Section 6, this
simple strategy actually performs surprisingly well in many
cases, especially when there exist many highly discrimina-
tive items. When this is not the case, however, an active
strategy is needed, motivating our second method.
5.2 FBC-Selection: An Active Strategy
Our active method, FBC-Selection, is summarized in
Algorithm 1. Let tˆ be the FBC classifier defined by (8).
Given observed ratings rA ≡ [rj ]j∈A ∈ R|A|, for some A ⊂
M, we define the risk L(tˆ(rA)) of the classifier to be 0 if the
prediction is correct, and 1 otherwise. Conditioned on rA,
the expected risk is E[L(tˆ(rA)) | rA] = 1 − Pr(tˆ(rA) | rA),
i.e., it equals the 1 minus the confidence of the classifier, the
posterior probability of the predicted type, conditioned on
the observed ratings. Since, by (7), FBC selects the type
that has the maximum posterior probability, the expected
risk is at most (and the confidence at least) 0.5.
FBC-Selection proceeds greedily, showing the item that
minimizes the classifier’s expected risk at each step. More
specifically, let A be the set of items whose ratings have been
observed so far. To select the next item to present to the
user, the algorithm computes for each item j ∈ M \ A, the
expected risk E[L(tˆ(rA ∪ rj)) | rA] if rating rj is revealed:∫
rj∈R(1− Pr(tˆ(rA ∪ rj)) | rA ∪ rj) Pr(rA ∪ rj | rA)drj .
This expected risk depends on the distribution of the unseen
rating rj conditioned on the ratings observed so far.
Under noise model (5) and prior (6), the expected risk for
each item j can be computed in a closed form. In particu-
lar, let MA, r¯A, δA be as defined in Theorem 1. Then, the
expected risk when revealing the rating of item j is propor-
tional to the following quantity, derived in the appendix:
Lj =
∫
rj
e
−
r¯TAj
MAj
r¯Aj
+2|δTAjMAjr¯Aj|+δ
T
Aj
MAj
δAj
2σ20 drj/
√
detΣAj (11)
where Aj = A∪{j}. The integration above is w.r.t. rj , i.e.,
the predicted rating for item j. The outcome of the above
integration can be computed in closed form in terms of the
error function erf (i.e., no numerical integration is neces-
sary). The formula can be found in the appendix. Each it-
eration amounts to computing the “scores”Lj for each item
j not selected so far, and picking the item with the lowest
score (corresponding to minimum expected risk). Once the
item is presented to the user, the user rates it, adding one
more rating to the set of observed ratings. The process is re-
peated until the confidence of the classifier (or, equivalently,
the expected risk) reaches a satisfactory level.
5.3 IncFBC: An Efficient Implementation
FBC-Selection requires the computation of the scores
Lj after each interaction with the user. Each such calcula-
tion involves computing the determinant det(ΣAj ), as well
as the matrix MAj = (I − VAjΣ−1AjV TAj ), both of which ap-
pear in (11). Though having a closed form formula for (11)
avoids the need for integration, computing each of these
matrices directly from their definition involves a consider-
able computational cost. In particular, the cost of com-
puting ΣA = λI + V
T
A VA is O(d
2|A|). Computing Σ−1A
and det(ΣAj ) have a cost O(d
3) multiplications using, e.g.,
LU-decomposition, which can be dropped to O(d2.807) us-
ing Strassen’s algorithm for multiplication [6]. Finally, the
computation of MA requires O(|A|×d2 + |A|2×d) multipli-
cations. As a result, the overall complexity of computing Lj
directly is O(|A|×d2+|A|2×d+d2.807). However, the perfor-
mance of these computations can be significantly reduced by
constructing these matrices incrementally: MAj , Σ
−1
Aj
and
det(ΣAj ) can be computed efficiently from MA, Σ
−1
A , and
det(ΣA), exploiting the fact that ΣAj = ΣA + vjv
T
j , i.e., it
results from Σi through a rank-one update. We discuss this
below.
Incremental computation of det(ΣAj ). The determinant
can be computed incrementally using only O(d2) multiplica-
tions through the Matrix Determinant Lemma [10], namely:
det(ΣAj ) = (1 + v
T
j ΣAvj) det(ΣA). (12)
Incremental computation of Σ−1Aj . The inverse of a rank-
one update of a matrix can be computed through the Sherman-
Morisson formula [26], which gives:
Σ−1Aj = Σ
−1
A − Σ−1A vjvTj Σ−1A /(1 + vTj Σ−1A vj), (13)
and again reduces the number of multiplications to O(d2).
Incremental computation of MAj . Finally, using (13),
we can also reduce the cost of computing MAj , as:
MAj =
[
MA+
φφT
1+vT
j
Σ
−1
A
vj
−ξ
−ξT 1−vTj ξ
]
(14)
where ξ = VA(Σ
−1
Aj
vj) and φ = VA(Σ
−1
A vj), which reduces
the computation cost to O(|A|2 + d2) multiplications.
In conclusion, using the above adaptive operations re-
duces the cost of computing Lj by one order of magnitude
to O(|A|2 + d2), which is optimal (as MA is an |A| × |A|
matrix, and ΣA is d × d). The rank-one adaptations yield
such performance without sophisticated matrix inversion or
multiplication algorithms, such as Strassen’s algorithm. The
we refer to resulting algorithm as IncFBC; we empirically
compare the two implementations in Section 6.
Algorithm 2 PointEst Active Learning
Input: Item profiles V , item biases Z, classifier C, confidence τ
1: A← ∅, rA ← ∅
2: repeat
3: tˆ← arg maxt∈T PrC(t | rA)
4: uˆ← (λI + V TA VA)−1V TA (rA − zAtˆ)
5: for all j ∈ M \ A do
6: rˆj ← uˆT vj + zjtˆ
7: Lj ← mint∈T PrC(t | rA ∪ rˆj)
8: j∗ ← arg minj Lj
9: Query user to obtain rj∗
10: A← A ∪ {j∗}, rA ← rA ∪ rj∗
11: until 1− Lj∗ > τ
5.4 Selection Through Point Estimation
An alternative method for selection can be constructed
by replacing the exact estimation of the expected risk with
a “point estimate” (see also [27]). In fact, such a selection
method can be easily combined with an arbitrary classifier
that operates on user-provided ratings as input. This makes
such an approach especially useful when the expected risk is
hard to estimate in a closed form. We therefore outline this
method below, noting however that several problems arise
when the risk is computed through such a point estimation.
We describe the method for a general classifier C, also
summarized in Algorithm 2. Given a set of ratings rA over a
set A ⊆M, the classifier C returns a probability PrC(t | rA),
for each type t ∈ T . This is the probability that the user’s
type is t, conditioned on the observed ratings rA. Given
a set of observed ratings rA, we can estimate the type of
the user using the classifier C though maximum likelihood
a-posteriori estimation, as tˆ(rA) = arg maxt∈T PrC(t | rA).
Using this estimate, we can further estimate the most likely
profile uˆ ∈ Rd through ridge regression [11] over the ob-
served ratings rA and the corresponding profiles VA (see Al-
gorithm 2 for details). Using the estimated profile uˆ and
the estimated type tˆ, we can predict the rating of every
item j ∈ M \ A as rˆj = uˆT vj + zjtˆ, and subsequently es-
timate the expected risk if the rating for item j is revealed
as mint∈T PrC(t | rA ∪ rˆj). We refer to this as a “point esti-
mate”, as it replaces the integration that the expected risk
corresponds to with the value at a single point, namely, the
predicted rating rˆj .
Using such estimates, selection can proceed as follows.
Given the set of observed ratings A, we can estimate the
risk of the classifier C for every item j inM\A through the
above estimation process, and pick the item with the mini-
mum estimated risk. The rating of this item is subsequently
revealed, and new estimates tˆ and uˆ can thusly be obtained,
repeating the process until a desired confidence is reached.
Clearly, point estimation avoids computing the expected
risk exactly, which can be advantageous when the corre-
sponding expectation under a given classifier C can only be
computed by numerical integration. This is not the case for
FBC, as we have seen, but this can be the only tractable
option for an arbitrary classifier. Unfortunately, this es-
timation can be quite inaccurate in practice, consequently
leading to poor performance in selections; we observe such
a performance degradation in our evaluations (Section 6).
Put differently, a point estimate of the risk takes into ac-
count what the predicted rating of an item j is in expec-
tation, and how this rating can potentially affect the risk;
however, it does not account for how variable this prediction
Dataset Type Users Items Ratings
All 6K 3K 1M
Movielens Gender (Female:Male) 1:2.5 - 1:3
Age (Young:Adult) 1:1.3 - 1:1.6
All 992 50 29.9K
PTV Gender (Female:Male) 1.8:1 - 1.6:1
Political Views (R:D) 1:1.6 - 1:2.1
All 26K 9921 5.6M
Flixster Gender (Female:Male) 1.7:1 - 1.5:1
Table 1: Dataset statistics.
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Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of number of ratings per
user for (a) Movielens (b) Politics-and-TV (c) Flixster.
is. A highly variable prediction might have a very different
expected risk; the exact computation of the expectation does
take this into account whereas point estimation does not.
6. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of our methods
using real datasets. We begin by describing the datasets and
experiments, then perform a comparative analysis of both
passive and active methods.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We evaluate our method using three datasets:
Movielens, Flixster [12], and Politics-and-TV (PTV) [25].
The Movielens dataset includes users’ ratings for movies
alongside with the users’ gender and age. For simplicity,
we categorize the age group of users as young adults (ages
18–35), or adults (ages 36–65). Flixster is a similar movie
ratings dataset, and contains user gender information. PTV
includes ratings by US users on 50 different TV-shows, along
with each user’s gender and political affiliation (Democrat
or Republican). We preprocessed Movielens and Flixster to
consider only users with at least 20 ratings, and items that
were rated by at least 20 users. Since PTV includes only
50 TV-shows, we preprocessed the data to ensure that each
user has at least 10 ratings. Table 1 summarizes the datasets
used for evaluation. For each user type, the table shows the
ratio between the number of users of one type versus the
other type (as labeled in the table). Figure 2 shows the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of
ratings per user across the three preprocessed datasets. We
see that for the Movielens and Flixster datasets, there are
many users with hundreds of items rated in their profile.
Evaluation Method. In our setting, the recommender sys-
tem infers user attributes from a set of strategically selected
items. To understand the effectiveness of FBC compared
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Figure 3: Cumulative distributions of the type bias (|zj |) for
the different datasets, zoomed to the top 20% of items.
to other classification methods in an adversarial setting, we
perform the following evaluation. We first split the dataset
into a training set (e.g., users that are willing to disclose
the private attribute) and evaluation set (e.g., users that
are privacy-sensitive), and train different classifiers on the
training set – e.g., in the case of FBC we learn the item pro-
files and biases. Then, for each user in the evaluation set,
we incrementally select items for the user to rate. In the
passive methods, the selection of next item does not depend
on the previous ratings provided by the user, whereas in the
active methods it does.
After the user rates an item, we use the classifier to infer
the private type. For any user, since we only have the rating
information for the set of movies that she has rated, we
limit the selection process to this set. Users may have rated
different number of movies, for instance, roughly 50% of
the users of Movielens have rated less than 100 movies out
of 3000 (see Figure 2). Therefore, we limit the number of
questions asked to 100 for Movielens and Flixster and all 50
for PTV. Unless specified, all evaluations of FBC were done
using the efficient incremental implementation IncFBC.
Evaluation Metrics. We evaluate classification perfor-
mance through the area under the curve (AUC) metric, and
prediction performance through the root mean squared er-
ror (RMSE). If a recommender system uses our method to
maliciously learn user features, it is important that such a
mechanism for strategic solicitation of ratings has a mini-
mal impact on the quality of recommendations, otherwise
the user may detect its hidden agenda. We measure the
quality of recommendations by holding out an evaluation
set of 10 items for each user. After every 10 questions (so-
licited ratings) we predict the ratings on the evaluation set
by applying ridge regression using the provided ratings and
item profiles to learn a user profile. We predict the ratings
on the evaluation set and compute the RMSE over all users.
Parameter settings. We split each dataset into training
and testing and perform MF with 10-fold cross validation.
We learn the item latent factors required by FBC using the
training set, with type biases for age, gender and political
affiliation as applicable to the three datasets. For MF, we
use 20 iterations of stochastic gradient descent [16] to mini-
mize (3), using the same regularization parameter for users
and movies. Through 10-fold cross validation we determined
the optimal dimension to be d = 20, and the optimal reg-
ularization parameter to be 0.1, for each of the biases. We
also compute the optimal λ used in the classifier (8) through
10-fold cross validation to maximize the AUC, resulting in
λ = 100 for gender and λ = 200 for age for the Movielens
dataset, λ = 10 for gender and political views for the PTV
dataset, and λ = 200 for gender for the Flixster dataset.
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Figure 4: Average AUC and RMSE of the FBC classifier with increasing questions for different passive selection strategies,
and IncFBC for comparison. Datasets (left to right) – Movielens-Gender, Movielens-Age, PTV-Gender, PTV-Political Views,
Flixster-Gender.
6.2 Passive Learning
Figure 4 shows the AUC and RMSE obtained using Max-
Gap, and two other passive methods – Random and En-
tropy. For reference, we also show the performance of our
active method IncFBC. Random selection is a natural base-
line as users may rate items in any arbitrary order. The
second method, Entropy, presents items to the user in de-
scending order of their rating entropy, i.e., start with items
that have polarized ratings. This method was shown to be
efficient in a cold-start setting in [23] as it can quickly build
user profiles in a matrix factorization based recommender
system.
AUC. Figure 4a shows that MaxGap performs significantly
better than the other passive methods on both Movielens
and PTV datasets. For the first 10 questions, which are
critical when considering the need for quick inference, it
is the best passive method on all datasets. Interestingly,
on Movielens-Gender and PTV-Politics, MaxGap performs
very similar to the adaptive, more complex IncFBC. As a
result of the greedy nature of MaxGap, we expect it to per-
form well on datasets that have items with large biases. To
better understand MaxGap’s performance, Figure 3 shows
the top 20% of the cumulative distributions of the type bi-
ases over the set of items in the different datasets. The plot
clearly shows that the items in PTV-Gender have the low-
est biases, resulting in the poorest performance of MaxGap.
Conversely, in Movielens-Gender, the biases are the largest,
thus MaxGap performs well, in par with the adaptive In-
cFBC. In PTV-Politics the biases are not overly high, but
since most users rate all items, a few discriminating items
are sufficient to enable MaxGap to perform well. This ob-
servation is supported by the findings of [5] that identified 5
TV-shows that immediately reveal a user’s political views.
RMSE. Figure 4b plots the RMSE over increasing number
of rated items, for MaxGap, Random, and Entropy, along
with IncFBC. Even though IncFBC and MaxGap are de-
signed to explore a specific attribute of the user’s profile,
they perform very well. Their RMSE is very close to that of
Random and Entropy, with the MaxGap visibly worse only
in one case, the PTV-Gender dataset. Since IncFBC and
MaxBias focus on quickly learning a singe attribute of the
user’s profile, it is expected that they perform worse than the
other methods, that aim to explore attributes more broadly.
However, the figures show that IncFBC and MaxGap are
almost identical to the other methods, and MaxGap only
perform worse in the PTV-Gender dataset. Moreover, in all
datasets, IncFBC performs close to a random selection, in-
dicating that IncFBC does not incur significant impact on
the RMSE relative to an arbitrary order in which a user may
rate items. Finally, IncFBC has an RMSE similar to the
entropy method, which is designed to improve the RMSE in
a cold-start setting.
These results show that a malicious recommender system
that uses IncFBC to infer a private attribute of its users can
also use the solicited ratings to provide recommendations,
making it difficult for users to detect the hidden agenda.
6.3 Active Learning
We compare our selection method to the logistic and multi-
nomial classifiers by adapting them to an active learning
setting. These classifiers were the top performing among
those studied in previous work [29] for gender prediction.
Following [29], we train both of these classifiers over rating
vectors padded with zeros: an item not rated by a user is
marked with a rating value of 0. In order to use logistic
and multinomial classifiers in an active learning setting we
use the point-estimate (PointEst) method as described in
Section 5.4 (see Algorithm 2). For the remainder of this sec-
tion we refer to PointEst with a logistic and multinomial
classifiers as Logistic and Multinomial, respectively.
AUC. Figure 5a plots the AUC of classification for a given
number of question using PointEst and IncFBC selection,
for all datasets. PointEst selector enables us to compare
FBC with the other classifiers for which we do not have a
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Figure 5: Average AUC and RMSE per number of questions for the three classifiers: IncFBC, multinomial (using PointEst
selector) and logistic (using PointEst selector). Datasets from left to right – Movielens-Gender, Movielens-Age, PTV-Gender,
PTV-Political Views, Flixster-Gender.
Movielens PTV Flixster
Gender Age Gender Politics Gender
FBC 0.827 0.825 0.683 0.748 0.650
Logistic 0.865 0.906 0.756 0.778 0.861
Multinomial 0.810 0.817 0.753 0.758 0.747
SVM (RBF) 0.838 0.893 0.613 0.737 NA
Table 2: AUC of classification with full user history.
closed-form solution for selection. In all datasets, the plots
show that IncFBC significantly outperforms both logistic
and multinomial within a few questions, and reaches an im-
provement in AUC of 10–30% in the Movielens and Flixster
datasets. PointEst with the other classifiers is unable to
achieve a good classification accuracy.
To put this in perspective, Table 2 shows the performance
of these classifiers, and that of a non-linear classifier SVM
with RBF kernel, using all user ratings. Note that this table
considers all ratings performed by all users in each dataset,
whereas the plots in Figure 5a show the average AUC com-
puted over the users that have rated the indicated number of
questions. Logistic and in some cases multinomial classifiers
perform significantly better than FBC, when classifying over
the entire dataset. This shows that although any of these
classifiers could be used for a static attack [29], FBC is bet-
ter suited to adaptive attacks with fewer available ratings.
For instance, using IncFBC with just 20 movies per user we
obtain a classification accuracy that is reasonably close to
that obtained by static inference techniques which use the
complete dataset.
RMSE. For completeness, Figure 5b provides the RMSE
using the different active methods, showing that IncFBC
has a lower RMSE on almost all datasets.
Running Time. Finally, we seek to quantify the improve-
ment in execution time obtained by the incremental compu-
tations of IncFBC. We ran both FBC and IncFBC on a
commodity server with a RAM size of 128GB and a CPU
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Figure 6: Running time improvement of IncFBC over FBC.
speed of 2.6GHz. Figure 6 shows the average time per movie
selection for both FBC and IncFBC for increasing number
of questions (movies presented to the user). The error bars
depict the 95% confidence interval surrounding the mean.
The plot shows that when the number of questions is small
the time per question is relatively constant, and increases
with the number of questions. As discussed in Section 5.3,
when the number of questions is smaller than the dimension
of the factor vectors (in our case d = 20), the complexity of
the efficient algorithm is dominated by d. In the first few
questions FBC is slightly faster than IncFBC as a result
of the efficient implementation of inversion for small matri-
ces. However, as the matrix becomes larger, the size of the
matrix dominates the complexity and the incremental com-
putations performed in IncFBC are significantly faster than
FBC, reaching a speedup of 30%.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We presented a new attack that a recommender system
could use to pursue a hidden agenda of inferring private at-
tributes for users that do not voluntarily disclose them. Our
solution, that includes a mechanism to select which question
to ask a user, as well as a classifier, is efficient both in terms
of the number of questions asked, and the runtime to gen-
erate each question. Moving beyond binary attributes to
multi-category attributes, using the relationship of our clas-
sifier to LDA, is an interesting open question. Exploring the
attack from the user’s perspective, to better advise users on
ways to identify and potentially mitigate such attacks is also
an important future direction.
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APPENDIX
Derivation of Equation (11) . For Aj = A∪{j} and tc the
binary complement of t, the expected risk E[L(tˆ(rAj )) | rA],
if the rating for movie j is revealed is∫
rj∈R
Pr(tˆc(rAj ) | rAj ) Pr(rAj | rA)drj
=
∫
rj∈R
Pr(b¯(rAj ) | rAj )
Pr(rAj )
Pr(rA)
drj
(9),(10)
= C
∫
rj∈R
e
yT
tˆc(rAj
)
(
VAjΣ
−1
Aj
V TAj
−I
)
y
bˆc(rAj
)
/2σ20
drj√
det(ΣAj )
where ytˆ(rAj )
= rAj − zAj tˆc(rAj ), ΣAj = λI + V
T
Aj
VAj , and
C a term that does not depend on j. The expected risk is
thus proportional to:
Lj =
∫
rj∈R e
−(rAj−zAjtˆc(rAj )
)TMAj (rAj−zAjtˆc(rAj )
)/2σ21
drj√
|ΣAj |
where |ΣAj | = det(ΣAj ) MAj = I−VAjΣ−1AjV TAj and tˆc(rAj )
the complement of prediction under rAj . Under Theorem 1,
as tˆ is given by (8), Lj simplifies to (11).
Closed Form of (11). Let ξ = VA(Σ
−1
Aj
vj), φ =
VA(Σ
−1
A vj), µ1 = MA +
φφT
1+vTj Σ
−1
A
vj
and µ2 = 1− vTj Σ−1Aj vj .
Then, from (14) we get that:
r¯TAjMAj r¯Aj + 2|δTAjMAj r¯Aj |+ δTAjMAj δAj =
µ2r¯
2
j − 2r¯TAξr¯j + |(δjµ2 − δTAξ)r¯j + δTAµ1r¯A − δjξT r¯A|
+ r¯TAµ1r¯A + δ
T
AjMAj δAj
For simplicity of exposition, let α1 = µ2/σ
2
1 , α2 =
−2rTAξ/σ21 , α3 = (zjµ2 − zTAξ)/σ21 , α4 = (zTAµ1 −
zjξ
T )rA/σ
2
1 , α5 = (r
T
Aµ1rA + z
T
Aj
MAj zAj )/σ
2
1 If α3 > 0,
substituting these in the risk, we have,
Lj =
1√
|ΣAj |
(∫ −α4
α3
rj=−∞
e−(α1r
2
j+(α2−α3)rj−α4+α5)/2drj
+
∫ ∞
rj=−α4α3
e−(α1r
2
j+(α2+α3)rj+α4+α5)/2drj
)
Letting x =
√
α1rj +
α2−α3
2
√
α1
and y =
√
α1rj +
α2+α3
2
√
α1
, and
substituting dx = dy =
√
α1drj we can rewrite the above
as,
Lj =
1√
α1|ΣAj |
(
e
(α2−α3)2
4α1
−α5+α4
2 h
(
α2 − α3
2
√
α1
− α4
√
α1
α3
)
+
e
(α2+α3)
2
4α1
−α5−α4
2 h
(
−α2 + α3
2
√
α1
+
α4
√
α1
α3
))
where h(x) =
∫ x
−∞ e
−x2/2dx, which can be expressed in
terms of the error function (erf). A similar derivation applies
if α3 ≤ 0.
